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Towards recognition 
of the group interest 
in the European Union?
Context
The 2011 report of the Reflection Group on the Future of European 
Company Law stated that «The EU Commission should consider, subject 
to evidence that it would be a benefit to take action at the EU level, to 
adopt a recommendation recognising the interest of the group.» The 
explicit aim of that report was to reinforce the flexibility of group mana-
gement in a cross-border context.
In 2012, following up on that report, the European Commission announced 
its firm intention to recognise the group interest when it declared that it 
would propose «an initiative» in that direction in 2014�1 This topic is moreo-
ver implicitly present in other current evolutions of European company law 
(propositions of directive on the single-member limited liability company 
or LLC,2 consultation on mergers and divisions)� The multiplication of entry 
points testifies that this issue presents a real practical challenge�
Summary of the recommendations
On the general structure of a european initiative
In order for legal contraints to be adapted to economic stakes, deci-
sion-making processes inside cross-border groups must be made more 
flexible and more secure, especially when the individual interests of the 
subsidiaries are balanced against the overall interest of the group� 
(1) European Commission, Consultation on the future of European Company Law, 2012�
(2) Societas Unius Personae�
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A European recommendation would be a flexible solution for a harmo-
nised recognition of the group interest, since it would make it possible to 
avoid the difficulty of an increased legislative rigidity, which is always a 
disadvantage in terms of competitiveness�
On the regime of a european group interest 
The French “Rozenblum” case being quite well-known already in Europe, it 
should be recommended to the Member States that they adopt a similar 
legal mechanism�
Thus, within the framework of intra-group operations, the group interest 
should be allowed to be claimed by the leaders of the parent company 
or the subsidiary companies, for criminal as well as civil liability, based on 
the following criteria:
-  the belonging to a same group, based on the existence of structural 
links between the companies and the implementation of a common 
strategy;
-  the conformity of the decision to the group interest, without the 
company which bears the charge of it being endangered (for that 
matter, that criterion alone would be enough in case of a whol-
ly-owned subsidiary);
-  the existence of a compensation to the benefit of the latter�
Draft for a european recommendation  
on the group interest  
WHEREAS: 
(1) The groups of companies and the holdings have a considerable 
economic weight. A few dozens of them account for most of the industrial 
and commercial activity worldwide. In practice, when a parent company 
defines its strategy, it may have to give priority to the group interest, even 
when the latter does not entirely coincide with its subsidiary’s own interest. 
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A homogenisation of such issues at European level would be appropriate 
since it would offer better legal certainty within cross-border groups. SMEs 
would also benefit from a regime making the coordination between seve-
ral European subsidiaries easier. They also face – maybe even more – 
legal difficulties in the management of foreign subsidiaries.
(2) It should be underlined that, on the one hand, the concept of the 
group interest is not contrary to the respect of the legal personality of the 
different companies of the group and that, on the other hand, the corpo-
rate interest is not exclusive of the group interest.
(3) The group interest should not be mistaken for «company law», as 
understood in Germany in particular, which implies a series of legal 
contraints that apply to the parent companies and subsidiaries. The 
economic operators unanimously consider that such an evolution would 
result in an inappropriate increased rigidity of business practice.
(4) In order to take into consideration the economic imperatives of the 
groups and to facilitate management, the group interest must mean the 
possibility for a parent company to take decisions – or to have its subsidia-
ries take decisions – which are first and foremost part of a global strategy 
of the group, and which are superior to the particular interests of each 
individual entity. However, such decision-making strategies should not 
endanger any subsidiary. Generally speaking, and provided other condi-
tions are respected – especially in terms of proportionality and balance 
– what is at stake is the establishment of a standardised framework for the 
intra-group operations in Europe through the enhancing of legal certainty, 
without the autonomy of the different structures being questioned.
(5) Broadly speaking, the two following observations can be made: 
-  The first observation is that of the existence of a real patchwork 
among Member States: some countries do not recognise the group 
interest (though there sometimes is corporate law, as in Germany), 
while others recognise the group interest, with wide variations depen-
ding on whether their legal system is built on case law or legislation. 
Such a heterogeneous assessment is characteristic of the practical 
difficulties that the cross-border groups may encounter.
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- The second observation is that there is a general tendency in a 
number of Member States where the law is evolving to move closer 
to the Rozenblum case.3 Such is the case for example in the Czech 
Republic or in Poland. That evolution towards standardisation should 
be encouraged, as it provides greater legal certainty.
(6) In 2012, the European Commisssion stated its intention to recognise 
the notion of the group interest by announcing that it would suggest «an 
initiative in 2014 aiming at (…) recognition of the group interest.»4 This was 
an outcome of the 2011 report of the Reflection Group on the future of 
European Company Law which stated that «The EU Commission should 
consider, subject to evidence that it would be a benefit to take action at 
the EU level, to adopt a recommendation recognising the interest of the 
group.»  
(7) Other current evolutions of European company law (proposition of a 
directive on the single-member limited liability company, or LLC, consulta-
tion of the Commission on mergers and divisions) also point out to that 
group interest. The multiplication of entry points testifies that that issue 
presents a real practical challenge.
Given the difficulties mentioned above, the protean character of the 
notion of the group interest in Europe, which results in legal uncertainty 
for the groups of companies, and the political will that has already been 
expressed, the European Commission RECOMMENDS the following to the 
Member States:
1) In order to meet to the greatest extent possible the needs of the 
companies, of all sizes, which are looking for growth and competitiveness, 
Member States should adopt an approach facilitating the cross-border 
management of groups, which would reduce the costs and ensure better 
certainty of internal operations.
2) Within that framework, the group should be defined based on the 
accounting consolidation scope, which is a standardised notion at Euro-
pean level.
(3) France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg…
(4) European Commission, Consultation on the Future of European Company Law, 2012�
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3) The operations at stake would mainly belong to three domains in which 
legal certainty should be enhanced:
-  the distribution of general costs within the group (administrative, IT 
and logistics costs);
-  the strategic choices of development: developing such and such 
business line may give an advantage to a subsidiary to the expense 
of another. Though such orientations may be a legitimate answer 
to economic objectives, they should not result in a company of the 
group being put into danger, which may imply that measures should 
be taken to protect minority shareholders and creditors;
-  the intra-group transactions that are not conducted under normal 
market conditions. 
4) Such recognition would be made in a standardised way based on the 
case law of some of the Member States5 defined as follows:
-  the group interest could be recognised at the level of criminal and civil 
liability, for the leaders of subsidiaries and parent companies;
-  for it to be characterised, the following conditions must be fufilled: 
•  belonging to a same group, based on the existence of structu-
ral links between the companies and the implementation of a 
common strategy;
•  conformity of the decision to the group interest, with no endange-
ring of the company that bears the charge of it;
•  existence of a compensation to the benefit of the latter.
-  In the case of wholly-owned subsidiaries, the sole criterion of not being 
put into danger could be enough.
(5) The countries which have adopted the «Rozenblum» doctrine, especially France, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Luxembourg���
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5) The recognition of the group interest should be accompanied by 
measures of information and protection of the minority shareholders and 
creditors, in particular to guarantee transparency as to the belonging to 
a group. 
6) For information purposes only, the intra-group operations that could be 
considered as belonging to the group interest are listed below:
The elaboration of that white list should be the result of the work conduc-
ted together with representatives of the economic operators organised 
in groups. To this end, appendix 2 to this document – which studies the 
intra-group operations at stake from the point of view of comparative law 
– could be helpful.
Economic data and legal issue
The groups of companies have a considerable economic weight. A few 
dozens of them account for most of the industrial and commercial acti-
vity worldwide� 
At the French level, a study6 conducted by INSEE – the French national 
institute of statistics and economic studies – and published in 2012, esta-
blished that the French productive fabric is «even more concentrated than 
it was thought to be»: 200 large companies employ 28% of the employees, 
produce one third of the added value, one half of the export turnover and 
almost two thirds of domestic spending in R&D�
Among the multiple motives that could support the adoption of that 
organisation, there is:7 
-  individualisation of branches of business and segmentation of risks, 
-  flexibility of the organisation of the management (distribution of responsi-
bilities), 
(6) That study is based on the new definition of the company as established by the 2008 law of 
modernisation of the economy based on economic criteria� The latter considers that a group is one 
and the same company, while the legal approach considers subsidiaries as autonomous legal units�
(7) « Les groupes de PME : une ou plusieurs sociétés ? » Paul Billon, Lexis Nexis Litec Professionnels 2009�
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-  financial flexibility (centralisation of the cash management by the parent 
company, possibility to compensate for the cash shortfalls of a subsidia-
ry with the cash surplus of another),
-  flexibility in the management (centralisation of common services: 
accounting, administrative, IT, financial and legal management),
-  fiscal flexibility�
For want of legal personality, the group of companies is a concept that 
is more economic that legal� Consequently, by virtue of the fundamental 
principle of the autonomy of legal persons, subsidiaries are distinct legal 
entities which have individual corporate interests� 
As it happens, the development of the concept of the «group interest» is 
a particularly illuminating manifestation of the need to reconcile econo-
mic realities and legal norms. For, «in many situations, there can be a 
fundamental contradiction in the legal independence of the controlled 
company – which may be only formal – and its economic dependence 
– which may be quite real – towards a controlling company or group 
of companies.»8 Thus, in practice, a parent company, when defining its 
strategy, may decide to give priority to the group interest, even though the 
latter doesn’t comply with its subsidiary’s own interest�
Such a hierarchical organisation of the specific interests of each company 
in relation to a group interest that is defined within the framework of an 
overall economic strategy calls for a specific legal treatment at the Euro-
pean level for enhanced legal certainty of cross-border groups� 
(8) « La notion de groupe de sociétés et d’entreprises en droit des activités économiques », J� Paillusseau, 
Recueil Dalloz 2003, p� 2346�
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 WHAT DOES «GROUP INTEREST» MEAN? 
First and foremost, a «corporate group law» (especially as understood 
in Germany), which implies a series of legal contraints that apply to 
the parent companies and subsidiaries, is not to be established� The 
economic operators unanimously consider that such an evolution 
would result in an inappropriate increased rigidity of business practice� 
However, the economic reality of the group should not be ignored. 
Because it legitimates the fact that its economic imperatives should be 
taken into account and because its aim is to facilitate management, 
the group interest means the possibility for a parent company to take 
decisions – or to have its subsidiaries take decisions – that are first and 
foremost part of a global strategy of the group, which is superior to the 
particular interests of individual entities� However, such decision-making 
strategies must not endanger a subsidiary� Generally speaking, and provi-
ded other conditions are respected – especially in terms of proportiona-
lity and balance – a standardised framework for intra-group operations 
in Europe would enhance legal certainty, without questioning the auto-
nomy of the different structures.
Substantive law in France
The concept of the «group interest» first appeared in the French 
Rozenblum case in 1985�9
In that system, the following conditions must be met for the leaders not to 
be accused of abuse of corporate assets based on the financial coope-
ration among the companies that belong to the same group:
-  there must be a group: the legal and financial links among the compa-
nies of the group must be demontrated, as well as the implementation of 
a common strategy aiming at the realisation of a common project;
(9) Cass� crim�, 4 févr� 1985, Bull� crim�, n° 54 ; JCP G, 1986, II, 20585, note W� Jeandidier ; D� 1985, p� 478, 
note D� OHL ; récemment, Cass� crim�, 10 févr� 2010, n° 09-83�691, F-D : JurisData, n° 2010-001541 ; R� 
Salomon, « L’intérêt de groupe, fait justificatif de l’abus de biens sociaux », Dr. sociétés, n° 5, mai 2010, 
comm� 103� The foundation for that case was laid down as soon as 1974 by the Tribunal correctionnel 
de Paris in the «Agache-Willot» case: T� corr� Paris, 16 mai 1974, Gaz� Pal�, 1974, 2, 886 ; JCP E, 1975, II, 
11816, obs� Lacoste�
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-  the operation must originate in a common economic, social or financial 
interest, which is to be assessed in relation to a policy that has been 
elaborated for the whole group;
-  the financial support should not come without any compensation or 
destabilise the balance of mutual commitments between the concerned 
companies;
-  the support should not exceed the financial possibilities of the company 
that bears the charge of it�
European benchmark  
In broad outline, two observations can be made:
-  The first observation is that of the existence of a real patchwork among 
Member States: some countries do not recognise the group interest 
(though they sometimes have corporate law, as in Germany), while 
others recognise the group interest, with wide variations depending on 
whether their legal system is built on case law or legislation� Such a hete-
rogeneous assessment is characteristic of the practical difficulties that 
the cross-border groups may encounter�
-  The second observation is that there is a general tendency in the Member 
States where the law is evolving to move closer to the French Rozenblum 
case: this is the case for the law in the Czesh Republic, and for case law 
in Poland� Such a movement of alignment should be encouraged, since 
it provides greater legal certainty�
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The group interest in 24 Member States: a close-up 
n  In Spain, statutory regime about the group interest being enacted�
n  States which do not recognise the group interest
A few elements of comparative law will be found in the appendices: 
-  the analysis of a certain number of legal systems in Europe in two 
comparative tables of substantive law (appendix 1);
-  a table on the intra-group operations that could be considered to 
be part of the group interest (appendix 2)�
(*) In Spain, statutory regime about the group interest being enacted�
(*)
TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF THE GROUP INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?
> Page 18
(10) Adapted from 2011 report of the Reflection Group on the future of EU Company Law�
The proposals in detail
I – Objectives
Given the companies’ quest for growth and competitiveness against 
foreign groups in a globalised context, it is important that their needs be 
met to the greatest extent possible� 
Needless to say, the problem of the group interest is more or less signifi-
cant depending on the configuration of the groups and the nature of 
the subsidiaries: wholly-owned subsidiaries or subsidiaries with minority 
associates, subsidiaries exclusively dedicated to an intra-group activity 
(for example, finances), or operating subsidiaries with their own clients�
Indeed, it is especially in cross-border groups which include operating 
subsidiaries with minority shareholders that a European recognition of the 
group interest would offer three major advantages: 
Reducing management costs
Today, management is made more complex for these groups by the diffe-
rences in the legal systems: the question daily arises of whether the group 
interest is recognised or not in such and such country, and if so, under 
what conditions� The necessity to conduct those controls of regulations or 
case law – potentially in the other 27 Member States – implies high legal 
costs, especially for SMEs which cannot have developed legal depart-
ments� In other words, adopting a standardised solution at the European 
level would result in simplification and savings�
Facilitating the internal management of cross-border 
groups  
In practice, recognition at the European level of the group interest would 
highlight that «there is a balance between benefits/losses which would 
be considered whenever a parent company gives an instruction that 
would protect the creditors and other stakeholders�»10 
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The management of groups could thus be more efficient and their deci-
sion-making more predictable�
Making intra-group operations more secure
It would be appropriate to create a «sphere of security» under criminal and civil 
law for the leaders that would work in a group of societies they would consider 
as one entity� That evolution would give more clarity to the directors of the subsi-
diaries who would have to approve the transactions with the parent company� 
 CASE STUDY 
Context:  
Italy, where the concept of the group of interest is legally recognised, provi-
des an example of the lack of legal certainty currently weighing on the 
groups of societies� Indeed, when a parent company exercises direction 
and coordination over a subsidiary, which is presumed when it controls the 
latter, it may take a decision that is contrary to the interest of the subsidiary 
provided there are compensatory advantages to it (« teoria dei vantaggi 
compensative»)� Traditionally speaking, those advantages are not neces-
sarily financial ones, and it is accepted that they may result from the profit 
coming from the overall strategy of the group� 
Facts:  
A tribunal11 penalised the leaders of an Italian subsidiary because they 
had given an advantage to the parent company, whose profit-sharing in 
the subsidiary was more than 80%, by signing a cash pooling contract with 
the group and buying a company� 
Comments:  
Insofar as it is only a first-instance decision, which is based on non-com-
pliance with the procedural rules as provided by the Consob, this cannot 
be analysed as the Italian law moving away from recognition of the 
group interest� This decision nonetheless illustrates that even when such 
recognition does exist, legal uncertainty remains because of the lack of 
harmonisation at European level�  
(11) Decision of the Parma Court (civil division), 28 March 2013 (not published)�
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II - Answers to be offered
A – Which european instrument? Not a directive,  
but a recommendation with a diffusion of good 
practices
A priori, there seems to be an alternative at European level: 
Comparison 
of legal bases
Directive
Recommendation 
(and/or informal approval 
of good practices)
ADVANTAGES
Higher level of 
harmonisation due to 
the constraining scope 
of the instrument�
Less burdensome 
legislative process� 
Flexibility of the rules 
(application and 
evolution)�
DRAWBACKS
Long and uncertain 
legislative process 
Difficulty to make the 
rules evolve over time 
(rigid law)�
Lower level of 
harmonisation due to the 
non-constraining scope 
of the instrument�
The advantage of a directive, given its binding capacity on Member 
States, would be to provide some legal certainty� However, given the legis-
lative process and the requirements in terms of majority, blockages may 
be feared, for certain countries are attached to their system�
Above all, from the perspective of the companies, the fact that flexibility 
is a necessity within the groups and the fact that it is vital to preserve the 
evolutionary character of the rules tend to promote a non-constraining 
support, therefore a recommendation with a diffusion of good practices:
-  at a technical level: if the institutional path is chosen, a recommen-
dation is the instrument that should be given priority, insofar as it is a 
non-constraining instrument for the Member States and would therefore 
more easily win their support� Moreover, it is easier for the content of a 
recommendation to change� 
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-  from a perspective of opportunity and pragmatism: a recommendation 
could result in an evolution of the companies as well as the national 
courts (provided of course that it would not be contrary to their national 
law) towards a harmonisation of the existing laws on the group interest� 
Beyond that, the Member States which do not recognise the group inte-
rest yet would naturally be led to consider the possibility of implementing 
it� Soft law through parallel diffusion of good practices would usefully 
complete that system�
B – What content: what European regime for the 
group interest?  
> Which scope of the group?
Out of simplicity and uniformity among the Member States, the defini-
tion of the group should be based on the accounting consolidation 
exercise, which is a concept that is already harmonised at the EU level 
through European directives� Thus, a company is included within the 
consolidation scope if an exclusive control, a joint control or a notable 
influence is exercised by the parent company�  
> What field of application for the group interest?
> Which operations would be included?
There are three main areas of decision-making in which the group interest 
could usefully enhance legal certainty:
1)  the rules of distribution of the general costs within the group (adminis-
trative, IT, logistics costs…);
2)  the strategic choices of expansion within the group: developing 
such and such business line may give an advantage to a subsidiary 
at the expense of another� Though such orientations may be a legi-
timate answer to economic objectives, they should not result in the 
endangering of one of the group’s companies, which may imply that 
TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF THE GROUP INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?
> Page 22
some measures should be adopted to protect minority shareholders 
and creditors;
3)  the intra-group transactions that are not made under normal market 
conditions. 
A (indicative) list of good practices in an appendice to the European 
recommendation on the group interest would be quite useful� It would be a 
guideline for the companies as well as, if need be, the courts of the Member 
States� It could, for example, target the cash or omnium agreements12  , or 
even the management conventions or management fees conventions�13 
> Which areas should be included in the group interest?
In French law, the sole origin of the field of application of the group interest 
is the criminal liability of the company executive, since it is an evidence of 
abuse of corporate assets� Though that concept has not been extended 
to other fields yet, there is a real interest in its being extended to civil liabi-
lity� Of course, this would by no means result in giving carte blanche to the 
leaders of companies and thereby risking abuses, and the scope of such 
an extension should only cover cases of mismanagement (excluding the 
violations of statutes, laws and regulations)�
For example, mismanagement is often mentioned in cases of 
advances among companies or in cases of maintaining of loss-ma-
king activities� In order to avoid liability being imposed in such cases, 
cash agreements must be made, or a strategic choice that is in the 
interest of the group must be underlined� 
(12) Through these conventions, the financial movements inside the group are centralised, thanks to 
a central company, which is usually the parent company� Each subsidiary then grants it the power to 
manage its treasury, which facilitates advances among companies through current accounts� 
(13) Through those conventions, common services (administrative, accounting, legal, financial, IT, 
human resources or central purchasing services) are centralised�
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> Which leaders could claim the group interest?
In French law, only the leaders of subsidiaries can benefit from the doctrine 
on the group interest, which seems to be too restrictive� 
Within the framework of a European recommendation, all the leaders of 
groups of companies, be they parent companies or subsidiaries, de facto 
or de jure, should be included�
> Which criteria should be chosen to identify a group interest?
To find a balanced solution that would at the same time take into consi-
deration the existing systems, the evolutions currently going on in several 
Member States and the needs of the companies, the common concept 
of the group interest:
- would apply to criminal as well as civil liability;
-  would be based on the “Rozenblum” test that is defined by the following 
criteria:
•  belonging to a same group, based on the existence of structural 
links between the companies and the implementation of a common 
strategy;
•  conformity of the decision to the group interest, with no endangering 
of the company that bears the charge of it;
•  existence of a compensation to the benefit of the latter�
In the case of wholly-owned subsidiaries, the applicability of a simplified 
Rozenblum test, which would be limited to controlling that there is no 
endangering of the company, may be considered�
> Which formalities?
In the interest of flexibility and simplicity, the application of the group inte-
rest should not be conditional to the completion of specific formalities� In 
particular, the possibility for a group to claim a «group interest» should not 
depend on the signing of a specific contract, as in Germany, nor even on 
a statement� 
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However, the recognition of the group interest should be accompanied 
by measures of information and protection of minority shareholders and 
creditors, in particular so as to guarantee transparency regarding the 
belonging to a group� That information would be published, by the parent 
company and the subsidiaries, for creditors and third parties to know�
As to the support to be chosen, there could be a publication on the 
websites of the companies of the group, and/or, to take the French 
example, in the management report as provided in Article L� 233-26 of the 
Code of Commerce� 
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APPENDIX 114 
Summary table  
of comparative law
(14) These tables are based on a comparative law study conducted by Professor Pierre-Henri Conac, 
University of Luxembourg�
Member States Recognition of the group interest
Declaration 
of membership  
of the group
Subordinate  
relation
Protection of the 
shareholders
Protection  
of the creditors
Law Case law
Minority shareholders’ 
withdrawal right
Specific rules other than 
bankruptcy law
France ✔
United  
Kingdom
✔
Italy ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Czech  
Republic
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Spain ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
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Member States Recognition of the group interest
Declaration 
of membership  
of the group
Subordinate  
relation
Protection of the 
shareholders
Protection  
of the creditors
Law Case law
Minority shareholders’ 
withdrawal right
Specific rules other than 
bankruptcy law
France ✔
United  
Kingdom
✔
Italy ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Czech  
Republic
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Spain ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
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Member States
No recognition of the group 
interest
Declaration 
of membership  
of the group
Subordinate  
relation
Protection of the 
shareholders
Protection  
of the creditors
Law Case law
Specific rules other than 
bankruptcy law
Germany 
de jure group 
(PLC)
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Germany 
de facto group 
(PLC)
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Germany 
Group of GmbH
✔ ✔ ✔
Portugal ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Austria ✔ ✔ ✔
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Member States
No recognition of the group 
interest
Declaration 
of membership  
of the group
Subordinate  
relation
Protection of the 
shareholders
Protection  
of the creditors
Law Case law
Specific rules other than 
bankruptcy law
Germany 
de jure group 
(PLC)
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Germany 
de facto group 
(PLC)
✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Germany 
Group of GmbH
✔ ✔ ✔
Portugal ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Austria ✔ ✔ ✔
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Detailed table 
of comparative law 
Germany Austria Portugal Slovenia
Existence of 
mitigations of the 
principle
In the «de jure group» of public limited companies (PLC): 
recognition of the group interest subordinated to the 
existence of a «management contract» (rare in practice)�
That contract may apply to all the subsidiaries of the 
group or only to some of them�
That contract has no fiscal value: only the contract of 
transfer of profits may result in fiscal integration�
«de facto group» = when a public limited company is 
able to exercise an influence on a controlled company 
but no management contract has been signed�
Case law regime 
but a convention 
between the parent 
and the daughter 
company may be 
allowed� 
Specific regime in case 
of a «group relation» 
between two companies: 
a/ if one of them 
completely controls the 
other;
b/ or if, as independent 
companies, they have 
agreed to be submitted 
to a unitary and 
common direction (joint 
group);
c/ or if, regardless 
of whether they 
are dependent or 
independent, a 
company entrusts 
the other with the 
management of its 
activities (subordinate 
relation)�
Distinction «de jure» v  
«de facto» group
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1 -  Member States in which the group interest  
is not recognised (with a few exceptions quoted 
below)
Germany Austria Portugal Slovenia
Existence of 
mitigations of the 
principle
In the «de jure group» of public limited companies (PLC): 
recognition of the group interest subordinated to the 
existence of a «management contract» (rare in practice)�
That contract may apply to all the subsidiaries of the 
group or only to some of them�
That contract has no fiscal value: only the contract of 
transfer of profits may result in fiscal integration�
«de facto group» = when a public limited company is 
able to exercise an influence on a controlled company 
but no management contract has been signed�
Case law regime 
but a convention 
between the parent 
and the daughter 
company may be 
allowed� 
Specific regime in case 
of a «group relation» 
between two companies: 
a/ if one of them 
completely controls the 
other;
b/ or if, as independent 
companies, they have 
agreed to be submitted 
to a unitary and 
common direction (joint 
group);
c/ or if, regardless 
of whether they 
are dependent or 
independent, a 
company entrusts 
the other with the 
management of its 
activities (subordinate 
relation)�
Distinction «de jure» v  
«de facto» group
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Germany Austria Portugal Slovenia
Which substantive 
conditions? 
The validity of the management contract is subordinated 
to the specification of an annual compensation to the 
minority shareholders of the subsidiary�
The terms and the manner of redemption of the shares 
of the subsidiary’s minority shareholders, who have a 
withdrawal right, must be laid down� However, this is not a 
condition for the validity of the management contract�
The existence of a «de facto group» creates specific 
obligations of compensation to the benefit of the 
subsidiary in case of a disadvantage�
The executive 
board of the 
subsidiary can 
take into account 
the group interest, 
only provided this 
does not result in 
a disadvantage 
for the subsidiary, 
unless the 
parent company 
immediately 
promises to 
compensate the 
subsidiary in the 
near future�
In case of a «de facto 
100% group», or of a 
«contractual group», the 
directors of the parent 
company can issue 
constraining instructions 
against the subsidiary in 
the interest of the group, 
provided they: 
a/ comply with the law 
and the subsidiary’s 
statutes;
b/ comply with the 
distribution of powers 
within the subsidiary�
Duty of care of the directors of the 
parent company�
In the «de facto group», the parent 
company must compensate any 
disadvantage being suffered by 
the subsidiary within the fiscal year�
Which formal 
conditions?
The conclusion of a management contract must result 
from a resolution by the general assembly of each of 
the companies involved� The statutes may include the 
consent of the supervisory board�
In the «de jure groups», a (non-public) management 
report, which must mention all the disadvantages 
suffered by the subsidiary due to the management, must 
be established by the leaders of the subsidiary�
In the «de facto groups», the board of directors must 
establish a management report, which is submitted to 
the supervisory board and to the auditors, and which lists 
the relations between the managing and the controlled 
companies and quantifies the detrimental measures�
In the «de jure group», if an order 
by the parent company implies a 
decision of the supervisory board of 
the subsidiary within a time limit, and 
that it has not been adopted within 
that time limit, the parent company 
can issue that instruction a second 
time, that time with the approval of 
its own supervisory board� When the 
order is issued a second time, the 
subsidiary must fulfill it�  
In the «de facto group», a 
dependence report, which describes 
the relations between the subsidiary 
and the parent company must be 
established by the leaders of the 
subsidiary in order to determine the 
amount of the compensation�
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Germany Austria Portugal Slovenia
Which substantive 
conditions? 
The validity of the management contract is subordinated 
to the specification of an annual compensation to the 
minority shareholders of the subsidiary�
The terms and the manner of redemption of the shares 
of the subsidiary’s minority shareholders, who have a 
withdrawal right, must be laid down� However, this is not a 
condition for the validity of the management contract�
The existence of a «de facto group» creates specific 
obligations of compensation to the benefit of the 
subsidiary in case of a disadvantage�
The executive 
board of the 
subsidiary can 
take into account 
the group interest, 
only provided this 
does not result in 
a disadvantage 
for the subsidiary, 
unless the 
parent company 
immediately 
promises to 
compensate the 
subsidiary in the 
near future�
In case of a «de facto 
100% group», or of a 
«contractual group», the 
directors of the parent 
company can issue 
constraining instructions 
against the subsidiary in 
the interest of the group, 
provided they: 
a/ comply with the law 
and the subsidiary’s 
statutes;
b/ comply with the 
distribution of powers 
within the subsidiary�
Duty of care of the directors of the 
parent company�
In the «de facto group», the parent 
company must compensate any 
disadvantage being suffered by 
the subsidiary within the fiscal year�
Which formal 
conditions?
The conclusion of a management contract must result 
from a resolution by the general assembly of each of 
the companies involved� The statutes may include the 
consent of the supervisory board�
In the «de jure groups», a (non-public) management 
report, which must mention all the disadvantages 
suffered by the subsidiary due to the management, must 
be established by the leaders of the subsidiary�
In the «de facto groups», the board of directors must 
establish a management report, which is submitted to 
the supervisory board and to the auditors, and which lists 
the relations between the managing and the controlled 
companies and quantifies the detrimental measures�
In the «de jure group», if an order 
by the parent company implies a 
decision of the supervisory board of 
the subsidiary within a time limit, and 
that it has not been adopted within 
that time limit, the parent company 
can issue that instruction a second 
time, that time with the approval of 
its own supervisory board� When the 
order is issued a second time, the 
subsidiary must fulfill it�  
In the «de facto group», a 
dependence report, which describes 
the relations between the subsidiary 
and the parent company must be 
established by the leaders of the 
subsidiary in order to determine the 
amount of the compensation�
TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF THE GROUP INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?
> Page 33
Germany Austria Portugal Slovenia
Liability 
Principle = no direct liability of the controlling company to 
the creditors of the dependent company�
In the «de jure groups», damages may be granted if the 
controlling company has not respected its duty of care 
when issuing orders�
In the «de facto groups», the leaders are liable only if 
damages are not compensated�
In the groups of GmbH, the liability of the parent 
company to the subsidiary is admitted in case of a 
violation of the interest of the latter by the former�
In case of «de facto 100% 
groups», or «contractual 
groups», there is a direct, 
unlimited and joint 
liability of the parent 
company for the debts 
of its subsidiaries (not 
applicable to the parent 
companies under foreign 
law)� 
If there is a violation of 
the duty to issue careful 
orders to subsidiaries, 
the leaders of the parent 
company of the “de jure 
group” and the parent 
company are jointly 
liable to the subsidiary for 
damages inflicted to the 
latter�
If the management 
report of the «de facto 
group» is inaccurate, the 
leaders of the subsidiary 
are jointly liable for the 
losses� 
The minority shareholders 
and creditors of the 
subsidiary can petition 
the court to order 
the parent company 
to compensate the 
disadvantages suffered 
by the subsidiary�
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Germany Austria Portugal Slovenia
Liability 
Principle = no direct liability of the controlling company to 
the creditors of the dependent company�
In the «de jure groups», damages may be granted if the 
controlling company has not respected its duty of care 
when issuing orders�
In the «de facto groups», the leaders are liable only if 
damages are not compensated�
In the groups of GmbH, the liability of the parent 
company to the subsidiary is admitted in case of a 
violation of the interest of the latter by the former�
In case of «de facto 100% 
groups», or «contractual 
groups», there is a direct, 
unlimited and joint 
liability of the parent 
company for the debts 
of its subsidiaries (not 
applicable to the parent 
companies under foreign 
law)� 
If there is a violation of 
the duty to issue careful 
orders to subsidiaries, 
the leaders of the parent 
company of the “de jure 
group” and the parent 
company are jointly 
liable to the subsidiary for 
damages inflicted to the 
latter�
If the management 
report of the «de facto 
group» is inaccurate, the 
leaders of the subsidiary 
are jointly liable for the 
losses� 
The minority shareholders 
and creditors of the 
subsidiary can petition 
the court to order 
the parent company 
to compensate the 
disadvantages suffered 
by the subsidiary�
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2 -  Member States in which the group interest  
is legally accepted
Italy Czech republic Hungary Spain
Conditions
The parent company may inflict damages to a subsidiary 
in the name of the «group interest» if there are actual 
«compensatory advantages»� 
System founded on the statement of the parent’s «control 
and coordination»�
The existence of a «control and coordination» is a 
rebuttable presumption resulting from the parent 
exercising an important influence in the preparation 
of the subsidiary’s annual accounts, its definition and 
implementation of a commercial strategy and its 
financial policy� 
Possibility for the parent 
company to give orders 
to any subsidiary in the 
group’s interest�
The recognition of the 
group interest is subject 
to the publication of the 
subsidiary’s belonging 
to the group on its 
website�
The leaders of 
the subsidiary 
must establish a 
dependence report�
If the order results 
in the subsidiary 
being inflicted a 
«disadvantage», 
the latter must be 
compensated except if 
the order was issued in 
the group’s interest and 
the disadvantage will 
be compensated within 
the group�
In a «de jure group», 
the «management 
contract» gives the 
right to give orders 
to subsidiaries� There 
must be at least three 
subsidiaries and they 
may include PLCs and 
LLCs�
The regime of the 
«de facto group» 
consists in allowing 
a person concerned 
(subsidiary’s minority 
shareholder or creditor) 
to petition the court 
for the application of 
a regime of the «de 
jure group» as soon as 
the conditions for the 
creation of a «de jure 
group» have been met 
for three consecutive 
years�
A reform proposed in 
2014 provides for
a regime based on the 
recognition of a power 
to give, in the group’s 
interest, orders that are 
potentially contrary to 
the subsidiary’s interest�
However, that power is 
only exercised provided 
it does not result in a 
violation either of the 
statutes or of the law, 
and does not create an 
insolvency risk for the 
subsidiary� 
Obligation to declare 
the belonging to 
a group to the 
Companies Registration 
Office, on the corporate 
documents and the 
websites of all the 
involved companies�
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Italy Czech republic Hungary Spain
Conditions
The parent company may inflict damages to a subsidiary 
in the name of the «group interest» if there are actual 
«compensatory advantages»� 
System founded on the statement of the parent’s «control 
and coordination»�
The existence of a «control and coordination» is a 
rebuttable presumption resulting from the parent 
exercising an important influence in the preparation 
of the subsidiary’s annual accounts, its definition and 
implementation of a commercial strategy and its 
financial policy� 
Possibility for the parent 
company to give orders 
to any subsidiary in the 
group’s interest�
The recognition of the 
group interest is subject 
to the publication of the 
subsidiary’s belonging 
to the group on its 
website�
The leaders of 
the subsidiary 
must establish a 
dependence report�
If the order results 
in the subsidiary 
being inflicted a 
«disadvantage», 
the latter must be 
compensated except if 
the order was issued in 
the group’s interest and 
the disadvantage will 
be compensated within 
the group�
In a «de jure group», 
the «management 
contract» gives the 
right to give orders 
to subsidiaries� There 
must be at least three 
subsidiaries and they 
may include PLCs and 
LLCs�
The regime of the 
«de facto group» 
consists in allowing 
a person concerned 
(subsidiary’s minority 
shareholder or creditor) 
to petition the court 
for the application of 
a regime of the «de 
jure group» as soon as 
the conditions for the 
creation of a «de jure 
group» have been met 
for three consecutive 
years�
A reform proposed in 
2014 provides for
a regime based on the 
recognition of a power 
to give, in the group’s 
interest, orders that are 
potentially contrary to 
the subsidiary’s interest�
However, that power is 
only exercised provided 
it does not result in a 
violation either of the 
statutes or of the law, 
and does not create an 
insolvency risk for the 
subsidiary� 
Obligation to declare 
the belonging to 
a group to the 
Companies Registration 
Office, on the corporate 
documents and the 
websites of all the 
involved companies�
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Italy Czech republic Hungary Spain
Protection of the 
minority and 
creditors of the 
subsidiary
Information on the situation of dependence in the 
Companies Register�
Withdrawal right:  
a/ in case of a substantial modification of the activity or 
structure of the subsidiary which deteriorates its situation;
b/ at the beginning and end of the management and 
coordination activity (unlisted company);
c/ in case of undue use of majority powers�
The loans granted by the parent to the subsidiary are 
subject to the loans by external creditors�
Dependence report, 
accessible to the 
shareholders�
The minority 
shareholders have 
a withdrawal right 
against the majority 
shareholder if there 
exists «an essential 
deterioration of the 
situation of the minority 
shareholder» or 
«significant damages 
inflicted against its 
legitimate interest»�
The management 
contract must include 
a detailed description 
of the group relations 
and the methods 
prescribed to protect 
the interests of the 
subsidiary’s minority 
shareholders and 
creditors�
No obligation for the 
parent company 
to compensate the 
losses�
However, the minority 
shareholders have a 
withdrawal right when 
a “de jure group” is 
established�
The subsidiary’s 
creditors may ask 
for an additional 
guarantee in case 
of a management 
contract�
A restrictive regime 
is provided for the 
intra-group financial 
guarantees that 
are granted by the 
subsidiaries, unless, 
for example, all the 
companies of the group 
subscribe to the same 
guarantee�
Recognition of the right 
for minority shareholders 
(unlisted companies) 
to withdraw when the 
group is established 
(for a duration of three 
months), and, in unlisted 
companies only, in 
case of damages 
not adequately 
compensated, for the 
duration of a year 
starting on the date 
of the damage, or on 
the date when the 
shareholder should have 
known the damage�
The subsidiary and 
the parent company 
are jointly liable for the 
payment of the shares�
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Italy Czech republic Hungary Spain
Protection of the 
minority and 
creditors of the 
subsidiary
Information on the situation of dependence in the 
Companies Register�
Withdrawal right:  
a/ in case of a substantial modification of the activity or 
structure of the subsidiary which deteriorates its situation;
b/ at the beginning and end of the management and 
coordination activity (unlisted company);
c/ in case of undue use of majority powers�
The loans granted by the parent to the subsidiary are 
subject to the loans by external creditors�
Dependence report, 
accessible to the 
shareholders�
The minority 
shareholders have 
a withdrawal right 
against the majority 
shareholder if there 
exists «an essential 
deterioration of the 
situation of the minority 
shareholder» or 
«significant damages 
inflicted against its 
legitimate interest»�
The management 
contract must include 
a detailed description 
of the group relations 
and the methods 
prescribed to protect 
the interests of the 
subsidiary’s minority 
shareholders and 
creditors�
No obligation for the 
parent company 
to compensate the 
losses�
However, the minority 
shareholders have a 
withdrawal right when 
a “de jure group” is 
established�
The subsidiary’s 
creditors may ask 
for an additional 
guarantee in case 
of a management 
contract�
A restrictive regime 
is provided for the 
intra-group financial 
guarantees that 
are granted by the 
subsidiaries, unless, 
for example, all the 
companies of the group 
subscribe to the same 
guarantee�
Recognition of the right 
for minority shareholders 
(unlisted companies) 
to withdraw when the 
group is established 
(for a duration of three 
months), and, in unlisted 
companies only, in 
case of damages 
not adequately 
compensated, for the 
duration of a year 
starting on the date 
of the damage, or on 
the date when the 
shareholder should have 
known the damage�
The subsidiary and 
the parent company 
are jointly liable for the 
payment of the shares�
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Italy Czech republic Hungary Spain
Liability
The leaders of the parent company who are liable for 
the wrongful acts which have been committed by the 
subsidiaries and cannot be justified by the theory of 
the «compensatory advantages», the leaders of the 
subsidiary and the parent company are jointly liable for 
damages�
The burden of proof of the violation of their duty is on the 
claimant�
The leaders of the 
subsidiary are not 
liable for the execution 
of the instructions�
The assessment of the 
existence of damage 
due to the execution of 
the instructions of the 
parent company must 
take into consideration 
the advantages and 
drawbacks resulting from 
the belonging to the 
group�
If the prejudice is 
not compensated 
adequately within 
the framework of the 
belonging to the group, 
the parent company 
must compensate the 
subsidiary within one 
year�
The parent company 
and its managers, 
together with the 
managers of the 
subsidiary are jointly 
liable for the damage 
incurred�
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Italy Czech republic Hungary Spain
Liability
The leaders of the parent company who are liable for 
the wrongful acts which have been committed by the 
subsidiaries and cannot be justified by the theory of 
the «compensatory advantages», the leaders of the 
subsidiary and the parent company are jointly liable for 
damages�
The burden of proof of the violation of their duty is on the 
claimant�
The leaders of the 
subsidiary are not 
liable for the execution 
of the instructions�
The assessment of the 
existence of damage 
due to the execution of 
the instructions of the 
parent company must 
take into consideration 
the advantages and 
drawbacks resulting from 
the belonging to the 
group�
If the prejudice is 
not compensated 
adequately within 
the framework of the 
belonging to the group, 
the parent company 
must compensate the 
subsidiary within one 
year�
The parent company 
and its managers, 
together with the 
managers of the 
subsidiary are jointly 
liable for the damage 
incurred�
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3 -  Member States in which the group interest  
is recognised by case law
France United Kingdom Ireland Netherlands Belgium Poland
Luxembourg, 
Denmark and 
Switzerland
Conditions
The group interest 
as grounds 
for abuse of 
corporate assets� 
See «Rozenblum» 
case: «In order 
to escape the 
provisions of 
articles 425-4 
and 437-3 of the 
24 July 196615 
law, the financial 
aid provided by 
the leaders of 
a company to 
another company 
belonging to the 
same group, in 
which they have 
direct or indirect 
profit-sharing, 
must be dictated 
by an economic, 
social or financial 
common interest, 
If an in bonis 
company is wholly 
owned, its board 
of directors can 
take into account 
the interests of the 
parent company 
when assessing 
the interest 
of a potential 
transaction for the 
company, since 
the parent is the 
shareholder for 
which the leaders 
should seek the 
success of the 
company� 
There is a higher 
risk of challenge 
if the subsidiary 
is in financial 
difficulties:
a/ its leaders must 
take the creditors’ 
interest into 
account and/or 
act in their interest;
Case law has 
admitted that 
the interest of the 
subsidiary may 
consist in ensuring 
the survival of 
other companies 
of the group by 
guaranteeing 
loans� It has then 
specified that the 
group interest 
could not be 
taken into account 
in case of a risk of 
insolvency of the 
subsidiary�
The parent 
company may 
issue instructions 
to its subsidiaries: 
general ones if 
the subsidiary 
is listed, more 
specific ones 
otherwise (for 
example, orders 
to conclude 
certain 
intra-group 
transactions)�
The subsidiary’s 
statutes must 
determine the 
authority that 
is competent 
to issue those 
instructions�
The leaders of 
the subsidiary 
must follow those 
instructions 
unless they are 
contrary to the 
corporate
Interests of the 
group taken into 
account in the 
assessment of 
the conformity 
of the operation 
to the individual 
corporate 
interest�
E�g� the 
corporate 
interest will be 
considered to be 
preserved when:
a/ the subsidiary 
itself benefits 
from long-term 
transactions 
(improvement 
of its capacity 
to borrow, 
better financial 
situation);
Entering into a 
management 
contract is allowed�
However, no 
disposition protects 
the subsidiary’s 
minority 
shareholders and 
creditors�
In case of a «de 
facto group», the 
subsidiary’s interest 
prevails and the 
leaders of the latter 
are not allowed by 
the law to take into 
account the group 
interest�
There is an 
obligation to 
declare the 
existence of 
such a group 
and to establish 
a dependence 
report�
In Luxembourg: 
proximity 
with the 
«Rozenblum» 
case�
In Denmark and 
Switzerland: 
case law allows 
a transaction 
between 
the parent 
company and 
its daughter to 
be unbalanced 
if the latter 
participates 
in a series 
of mutual 
transactions 
and if, in a 
reasonable 
future, the 
subsidiary will 
also receive a 
profit that will 
correct the 
imbalance� 
(15) Articles L�241-3, 4° et L�242-6, 3° of the French Code de commerce�
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France United Kingdom Ireland Netherlands Belgium Poland
Luxembourg, 
Denmark and 
Switzerland
Conditions
The group interest 
as grounds 
for abuse of 
corporate assets� 
See «Rozenblum» 
case: «In order 
to escape the 
provisions of 
articles 425-4 
and 437-3 of the 
24 July 196615 
law, the financial 
aid provided by 
the leaders of 
a company to 
another company 
belonging to the 
same group, in 
which they have 
direct or indirect 
profit-sharing, 
must be dictated 
by an economic, 
social or financial 
common interest, 
If an in bonis 
company is wholly 
owned, its board 
of directors can 
take into account 
the interests of the 
parent company 
when assessing 
the interest 
of a potential 
transaction for the 
company, since 
the parent is the 
shareholder for 
which the leaders 
should seek the 
success of the 
company� 
There is a higher 
risk of challenge 
if the subsidiary 
is in financial 
difficulties:
a/ its leaders must 
take the creditors’ 
interest into 
account and/or 
act in their interest;
Case law has 
admitted that 
the interest of the 
subsidiary may 
consist in ensuring 
the survival of 
other companies 
of the group by 
guaranteeing 
loans� It has then 
specified that the 
group interest 
could not be 
taken into account 
in case of a risk of 
insolvency of the 
subsidiary�
The parent 
company may 
issue instructions 
to its subsidiaries: 
general ones if 
the subsidiary 
is listed, more 
specific ones 
otherwise (for 
example, orders 
to conclude 
certain 
intra-group 
transactions)�
The subsidiary’s 
statutes must 
determine the 
authority that 
is competent 
to issue those 
instructions�
The leaders of 
the subsidiary 
must follow those 
instructions 
unless they are 
contrary to the 
corporate
Interests of the 
group taken into 
account in the 
assessment of 
the conformity 
of the operation 
to the individual 
corporate 
interest�
E�g� the 
corporate 
interest will be 
considered to be 
preserved when:
a/ the subsidiary 
itself benefits 
from long-term 
transactions 
(improvement 
of its capacity 
to borrow, 
better financial 
situation);
Entering into a 
management 
contract is allowed�
However, no 
disposition protects 
the subsidiary’s 
minority 
shareholders and 
creditors�
In case of a «de 
facto group», the 
subsidiary’s interest 
prevails and the 
leaders of the latter 
are not allowed by 
the law to take into 
account the group 
interest�
There is an 
obligation to 
declare the 
existence of 
such a group 
and to establish 
a dependence 
report�
In Luxembourg: 
proximity 
with the 
«Rozenblum» 
case�
In Denmark and 
Switzerland: 
case law allows 
a transaction 
between 
the parent 
company and 
its daughter to 
be unbalanced 
if the latter 
participates 
in a series 
of mutual 
transactions 
and if, in a 
reasonable 
future, the 
subsidiary will 
also receive a 
profit that will 
correct the 
imbalance� 
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to be assessed 
in relation to a 
policy that has 
been elaborated 
for the group as a 
whole, and must 
not come without 
compensation 
or destabilise 
the mutual 
commitments 
between 
the different 
companies 
concerned, 
nor exceed 
the financial 
possibilities of the 
company which 
bears the charge 
of it�»
b/ the intra-group 
transactions that 
were concluded 
when the 
company was 
already insolvent 
may be cancelled�
interest 
and inflict it 
«disproportionate 
damage»�
b/ the effort 
imposed on 
the subsidiary 
is proportionate 
to its financial 
means and to 
the benefit of 
the transaction it 
enjoys;
c/ the subsidiary 
is a member 
of a structured 
group, which 
has a common 
economic 
interest and not 
only a temporary 
and occasional 
group interest�
In 2009, based 
on a text 
drawing from 
the «Rozenblum» 
case, the 
recognition in 
case law of the 
group interest 
however resulted 
in an evolution 
of this approach: 
the assessment 
of the subsidiary’s 
decisions must 
take into account 
the fact that it is 
part of the group 
provided there 
is a consistent 
and sustainable 
policy of the 
group, within 
the framework 
of which the 
advantages and 
the drawbacks of 
belonging to the 
group for each 
of the company 
members are 
balanced�
It must however 
be established 
that the 
transaction 
will not inflict a 
certain loss to 
the subsidiary�
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to be assessed 
in relation to a 
policy that has 
been elaborated 
for the group as a 
whole, and must 
not come without 
compensation 
or destabilise 
the mutual 
commitments 
between 
the different 
companies 
concerned, 
nor exceed 
the financial 
possibilities of the 
company which 
bears the charge 
of it�»
b/ the intra-group 
transactions that 
were concluded 
when the 
company was 
already insolvent 
may be cancelled�
interest 
and inflict it 
«disproportionate 
damage»�
b/ the effort 
imposed on 
the subsidiary 
is proportionate 
to its financial 
means and to 
the benefit of 
the transaction it 
enjoys;
c/ the subsidiary 
is a member 
of a structured 
group, which 
has a common 
economic 
interest and not 
only a temporary 
and occasional 
group interest�
In 2009, based 
on a text 
drawing from 
the «Rozenblum» 
case, the 
recognition in 
case law of the 
group interest 
however resulted 
in an evolution 
of this approach: 
the assessment 
of the subsidiary’s 
decisions must 
take into account 
the fact that it is 
part of the group 
provided there 
is a consistent 
and sustainable 
policy of the 
group, within 
the framework 
of which the 
advantages and 
the drawbacks of 
belonging to the 
group for each 
of the company 
members are 
balanced�
It must however 
be established 
that the 
transaction 
will not inflict a 
certain loss to 
the subsidiary�
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France United Kingdom Ireland Netherlands Belgium Poland
Luxembourg, 
Denmark and 
Switzerland
Liability
The group interest 
is not taken into 
account in fiscal 
law nor in law 
on collective 
procedures: 
a/ the operation 
that conforms to 
the group interest 
may be described 
as a normal act of 
management;
b/ the group 
interest does 
not allow for 
bankruptcy to be 
justified�
The subsidiary’s 
leaders may be 
considered liable 
to the subsidiary 
and/or its creditors 
if the subsidiary 
goes bankrupt 
and they knew 
or should have 
known there was 
no reasonable 
perspective of 
avoiding it and 
have not done 
everything that 
was possible to 
limit the damage 
incurred by the 
creditors (wrongful 
trading)�
When it gives its 
subsidiary instructions 
that go against its 
interest, a parent 
company assumes 
liability for violation of 
the legal obligation 
of acting in good 
faith and equity 
towards its subsidiary; 
that liability may 
be assumed to the 
subsidiary and its 
associates (especially 
the minority)�
The shareholders 
of the parent 
company may also 
assume liability to 
the subsidiary or 
its creditors if they 
fail in their duty of 
prudence�
Failure to respect 
the corporate 
interest may 
be penalised 
by the nullity or 
non-fulfillment of 
the obligations 
provided for only if 
the co-contracting 
party knew or 
should have 
known that the 
transaction was 
against the 
corporate interest� 
Those penalties are 
applicable without 
prejudice of the 
rights of the third 
parties acting in 
good faith�
Efficiency of 
the limitation of 
liability clauses as 
stipulated between 
the parent and 
the subsidiary, to 
the benefit of the 
former�
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France United Kingdom Ireland Netherlands Belgium Poland
Luxembourg, 
Denmark and 
Switzerland
Liability
The group interest 
is not taken into 
account in fiscal 
law nor in law 
on collective 
procedures: 
a/ the operation 
that conforms to 
the group interest 
may be described 
as a normal act of 
management;
b/ the group 
interest does 
not allow for 
bankruptcy to be 
justified�
The subsidiary’s 
leaders may be 
considered liable 
to the subsidiary 
and/or its creditors 
if the subsidiary 
goes bankrupt 
and they knew 
or should have 
known there was 
no reasonable 
perspective of 
avoiding it and 
have not done 
everything that 
was possible to 
limit the damage 
incurred by the 
creditors (wrongful 
trading)�
When it gives its 
subsidiary instructions 
that go against its 
interest, a parent 
company assumes 
liability for violation of 
the legal obligation 
of acting in good 
faith and equity 
towards its subsidiary; 
that liability may 
be assumed to the 
subsidiary and its 
associates (especially 
the minority)�
The shareholders 
of the parent 
company may also 
assume liability to 
the subsidiary or 
its creditors if they 
fail in their duty of 
prudence�
Failure to respect 
the corporate 
interest may 
be penalised 
by the nullity or 
non-fulfillment of 
the obligations 
provided for only if 
the co-contracting 
party knew or 
should have 
known that the 
transaction was 
against the 
corporate interest� 
Those penalties are 
applicable without 
prejudice of the 
rights of the third 
parties acting in 
good faith�
Efficiency of 
the limitation of 
liability clauses as 
stipulated between 
the parent and 
the subsidiary, to 
the benefit of the 
former�
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APPENDIX 2 
Country Management fees Tax consolidation convention Interest-free loan
Netherlands
Such conventions are frequently used in the Netherlands and 
generally accepted in company law�
From a fiscal point of view, the Netherlands have 
consolidated the rules that are applicable in terms of 
transfer prices and codified the arm’s-length principle� The 
conventions of service delivery must therefore be realised 
under arm’s-length conditions� The transactions which are 
without substance or of which the terms and conditions do 
not seem rational from an economic point of view, as well 
as the transactions that are not documented by a written 
agreement are likely to be problematic from a fiscal point of 
view�
A recent decree on the applicable regime in transfer prices 
has also clarified the fact that certain intra-group services 
(the list of which is not comprehensive) which are linked to 
corporate governance are not always shareholder services 
and may be paid at arm’s length�
Such conventions are 
frequently used in the 
Netherlands�
There is a risk of 
challenge in case 
it is contrary to the 
corporate interest 
of the company 
that is liable for the 
tax� Thus the whole 
context surrounding 
the transaction is 
to be taken into 
consideration in 
order to determine 
if the transaction 
fufills the corporate 
object� In any case, it 
is recommended that 
the economic interest 
of the transaction 
for the company 
be made explicit in 
the preamble to the 
tax consolidation 
convention�
The Netherlands law has integrated the arm’s-length 
principle� According to that principle, free-interest loans 
or loans carrying interest below market conditions are 
considered as shareholder’s loans if they are granted 
by a company taking part directly or indirectly in the 
debtor’s management, control or capital or if the 
same persons participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
management, control or capital of the debtor and the 
company that grants the loan�
In that case, the amount of the debt is considered as a 
part of the debtor’s capital� In the case of an interest-free 
loan granted from a parent to a daughter company 
to buy a sub-subsidiary, the Supreme Court has even 
refused to consider as abuse of corporate assets 
the fact that the Dutch subsidiary fiscally deduced 
the amount of the interests that the parent did not 
perceived, while declaring the same amount as capital 
contribution� The Court considered that when a group 
carries out an acquisition to a third party, the trade 
feature of the transaction is proven, even when the 
acquisition is being paid for thanks to an interest-free 
loan by one of the group’s companies, when the group 
could have paid for the acquisition by buying shares, or 
when the deduction of the interest that was not applied 
was not offset by the taxation of that interest in the 
parent company (in that case an Irish company)
(Supreme Court, 17 December 2004, case No 39,080)�
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Netherlands
Such conventions are frequently used in the Netherlands and 
generally accepted in company law�
From a fiscal point of view, the Netherlands have 
consolidated the rules that are applicable in terms of 
transfer prices and codified the arm’s-length principle� The 
conventions of service delivery must therefore be realised 
under arm’s-length conditions� The transactions which are 
without substance or of which the terms and conditions do 
not seem rational from an economic point of view, as well 
as the transactions that are not documented by a written 
agreement are likely to be problematic from a fiscal point of 
view�
A recent decree on the applicable regime in transfer prices 
has also clarified the fact that certain intra-group services 
(the list of which is not comprehensive) which are linked to 
corporate governance are not always shareholder services 
and may be paid at arm’s length�
Such conventions are 
frequently used in the 
Netherlands�
There is a risk of 
challenge in case 
it is contrary to the 
corporate interest 
of the company 
that is liable for the 
tax� Thus the whole 
context surrounding 
the transaction is 
to be taken into 
consideration in 
order to determine 
if the transaction 
fufills the corporate 
object� In any case, it 
is recommended that 
the economic interest 
of the transaction 
for the company 
be made explicit in 
the preamble to the 
tax consolidation 
convention�
The Netherlands law has integrated the arm’s-length 
principle� According to that principle, free-interest loans 
or loans carrying interest below market conditions are 
considered as shareholder’s loans if they are granted 
by a company taking part directly or indirectly in the 
debtor’s management, control or capital or if the 
same persons participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
management, control or capital of the debtor and the 
company that grants the loan�
In that case, the amount of the debt is considered as a 
part of the debtor’s capital� In the case of an interest-free 
loan granted from a parent to a daughter company 
to buy a sub-subsidiary, the Supreme Court has even 
refused to consider as abuse of corporate assets 
the fact that the Dutch subsidiary fiscally deduced 
the amount of the interests that the parent did not 
perceived, while declaring the same amount as capital 
contribution� The Court considered that when a group 
carries out an acquisition to a third party, the trade 
feature of the transaction is proven, even when the 
acquisition is being paid for thanks to an interest-free 
loan by one of the group’s companies, when the group 
could have paid for the acquisition by buying shares, or 
when the deduction of the interest that was not applied 
was not offset by the taxation of that interest in the 
parent company (in that case an Irish company)
(Supreme Court, 17 December 2004, case No 39,080)�
Comparison of intra-group opera-
tions which could be considered 
to be part of the group interest 
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Country Management fees Tax consolidation convention Interest-free loan
Great Britain
Such conventions are frequently used in Great Britain� The 
leaders assume liability when they determine the amount 
of the management fees which must be reasonable, 
proportionate, and reflect the services performed� The 
approval of the shareholders on that point should be 
sought� Indeed, there is no equivalent of the French 
procedure on regulated conventions; in English law, only 
the transactions in which the members of the board of 
directors or the supervisory board are interested are paid 
any attention, and those leaders are only obliged to 
give the shareholders information on their interest in the 
transaction but are not obliged to obtain their approval� 
Thus the convention that links the companies of a same 
group does not have to be approved by the shareholders�
If the management fees which are paid by a subsidiary to 
the parent company are too high, there is a risk for them to 
be considered as principal repayment�
In case of a collective procedure, the payment of 
management fees may be revoked and the leaders may 
incur liability on that point�
Those conventions are very little 
used (mainly within consortium relief, 
a regime of fiscal consolidation 
in which the consolidation is less 
pronounced than in the regime of 
group relief, the difference being 
justified by a different percentage 
of participation, either inferior or 
superior to 75 %)�
The transfers of intra-group fiscal 
deficits without compensation may 
raise some issues and the value 
of such deficits must therefore be 
considered prior to their transfer� 
Pratice in this area varies�
Certain groups demand immediate 
financial compensation for the 
deficit transfer or waiver� Others 
operate based on mutual 
assistance�
Those issues may become quite 
acute if the subsidiary in question 
is being transferred (especially in 
relation to the financial assistance 
rules) and/or if a group changes its 
practice so as to facilitate a transfer�
Those conventions are only used 
occasionally due to the risk that they 
be requalified as capital contribution 
and the fiscal risk (risk of taxation as 
income since cross-border interest-free 
loans (in favour of a subsidiary within 
the group) may be problematic in view 
of the rules applicable in matters of 
transfer prices)�
The leaders of a company which 
grants such a loan must in particular 
check that the fact that the loan 
is interest-free will truly benefit the 
company and its shareholders� They 
must take into consideration the 
duration of the loan and the probability 
of its being repaid�
Given the difficulty for the money-
lender to establish their corporate 
interest, it is recommended that the 
shareholders approve that decision 
so as to prevent any risk of their 
challenging it later on�
In cases of collective procedure, the 
convention providing that an interest-
free loan be granted may be revoked 
as being undervalued and the leaders 
may be held liable specifically on that 
point�
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Country Management fees Tax consolidation convention Interest-free loan
Great Britain
Such conventions are frequently used in Great Britain� The 
leaders assume liability when they determine the amount 
of the management fees which must be reasonable, 
proportionate, and reflect the services performed� The 
approval of the shareholders on that point should be 
sought� Indeed, there is no equivalent of the French 
procedure on regulated conventions; in English law, only 
the transactions in which the members of the board of 
directors or the supervisory board are interested are paid 
any attention, and those leaders are only obliged to 
give the shareholders information on their interest in the 
transaction but are not obliged to obtain their approval� 
Thus the convention that links the companies of a same 
group does not have to be approved by the shareholders�
If the management fees which are paid by a subsidiary to 
the parent company are too high, there is a risk for them to 
be considered as principal repayment�
In case of a collective procedure, the payment of 
management fees may be revoked and the leaders may 
incur liability on that point�
Those conventions are very little 
used (mainly within consortium relief, 
a regime of fiscal consolidation 
in which the consolidation is less 
pronounced than in the regime of 
group relief, the difference being 
justified by a different percentage 
of participation, either inferior or 
superior to 75 %)�
The transfers of intra-group fiscal 
deficits without compensation may 
raise some issues and the value 
of such deficits must therefore be 
considered prior to their transfer� 
Pratice in this area varies�
Certain groups demand immediate 
financial compensation for the 
deficit transfer or waiver� Others 
operate based on mutual 
assistance�
Those issues may become quite 
acute if the subsidiary in question 
is being transferred (especially in 
relation to the financial assistance 
rules) and/or if a group changes its 
practice so as to facilitate a transfer�
Those conventions are only used 
occasionally due to the risk that they 
be requalified as capital contribution 
and the fiscal risk (risk of taxation as 
income since cross-border interest-free 
loans (in favour of a subsidiary within 
the group) may be problematic in view 
of the rules applicable in matters of 
transfer prices)�
The leaders of a company which 
grants such a loan must in particular 
check that the fact that the loan 
is interest-free will truly benefit the 
company and its shareholders� They 
must take into consideration the 
duration of the loan and the probability 
of its being repaid�
Given the difficulty for the money-
lender to establish their corporate 
interest, it is recommended that the 
shareholders approve that decision 
so as to prevent any risk of their 
challenging it later on�
In cases of collective procedure, the 
convention providing that an interest-
free loan be granted may be revoked 
as being undervalued and the leaders 
may be held liable specifically on that 
point�
TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF THE GROUP INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?
> Page 51
Country Management fees Tax consolidation convention Interest-free loan
Germany
Large corporate groups and private equity structures 
frequently use it�
This is called «group charge», or «service charge», and 
it is sometimes used for tax purposes such as profits 
moving thanks to the transfer prices or the creation of a 
VAT-subject entity�
To be fiscally valid, the intra-group transactions must 
comply with the arm’s length principle� Generally speaking, 
this is the case when:
-   the transaction results from written agreements 
concluded up front and complies with the terms and 
conditions provided for� 
-   when the compensation provided for reflects the profit 
(i�e� the compensation must equal the price a third 
co-contracting party would have paid)�
The arm’s length principle also applies in company 
law� Public limited companies (PLC) cannot escape it; 
the rules are more flexible for limited liability companies 
(«GmbH»), even though the conditions that are used 
outside market conditions are generally challengeable 
when the company is in financial difficulties or is subject to 
a collective procedure� The determining criterion (following 
the German rules of «maintaining capital levels») is to know 
whether the payment of the price affects the corporate 
capital of the limited liability company�
-   The application of non-competition conditions may 
justify return proceedings and the leaders assuming 
liability�
The tax consolidation 
conventions do not exist as 
such� However, a profit and loss 
pooling agreement is quite 
frequently made, together with 
a domination agreement, which 
makes it possible to benefit from 
the rules of fiscal integration 
when the other conditions 
are met (especially financial 
consolidation)�
-  The control and profit and loss 
pooling agreements must be 
approved by the shareholders, 
which is a difficult procedure in 
the case of listed companies 
(general assembly, obligation 
of substantial information)�
-  Minority shareholders have 
the right to an interest, 
the payment of which is 
guaranteed, and must be 
granted a put option� The 
guaranteed interest and the 
exercise of the put option must 
be equitably valued�
The validity of the interest-free loans is 
debated� The public limited companies 
(PLC) are there again subject to stricter 
criteria than the limited liability companies 
(«GmbH»)� 
Long-term interest-free loans offer more 
difficulties than short-term loans� Moreover, 
the long-term loans are subject to general 
restrictions (which apply to interest in 
particular): the application for repayment 
must be about the whole amount and 
the repayment made in the year prior to 
the company becoming insolvent may be 
challenged in a collective procedure�
Those restrictions do not apply if there is a 
control/ profit and loss pooling agreement 
since the subsidiary is protected by the loss 
compensation claim�
The long- and mid-term loans at a rate 
inferior to the market are fiscally reclassified 
as dividend, which means that the lending 
company is liable for taxes as if it had 
collected an interest at the market rate (i�e� 
the amount of the interest at the market 
rate is added to the taxable result), and the 
shareholder is liable for taxes as if they had 
received a dividend of the same amount� 
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Country Management fees Tax consolidation convention Interest-free loan
Germany
Large corporate groups and private equity structures 
frequently use it�
This is called «group charge», or «service charge», and 
it is sometimes used for tax purposes such as profits 
moving thanks to the transfer prices or the creation of a 
VAT-subject entity�
To be fiscally valid, the intra-group transactions must 
comply with the arm’s length principle� Generally speaking, 
this is the case when:
-   the transaction results from written agreements 
concluded up front and complies with the terms and 
conditions provided for� 
-   when the compensation provided for reflects the profit 
(i�e� the compensation must equal the price a third 
co-contracting party would have paid)�
The arm’s length principle also applies in company 
law� Public limited companies (PLC) cannot escape it; 
the rules are more flexible for limited liability companies 
(«GmbH»), even though the conditions that are used 
outside market conditions are generally challengeable 
when the company is in financial difficulties or is subject to 
a collective procedure� The determining criterion (following 
the German rules of «maintaining capital levels») is to know 
whether the payment of the price affects the corporate 
capital of the limited liability company�
-   The application of non-competition conditions may 
justify return proceedings and the leaders assuming 
liability�
The tax consolidation 
conventions do not exist as 
such� However, a profit and loss 
pooling agreement is quite 
frequently made, together with 
a domination agreement, which 
makes it possible to benefit from 
the rules of fiscal integration 
when the other conditions 
are met (especially financial 
consolidation)�
-  The control and profit and loss 
pooling agreements must be 
approved by the shareholders, 
which is a difficult procedure in 
the case of listed companies 
(general assembly, obligation 
of substantial information)�
-  Minority shareholders have 
the right to an interest, 
the payment of which is 
guaranteed, and must be 
granted a put option� The 
guaranteed interest and the 
exercise of the put option must 
be equitably valued�
The validity of the interest-free loans is 
debated� The public limited companies 
(PLC) are there again subject to stricter 
criteria than the limited liability companies 
(«GmbH»)� 
Long-term interest-free loans offer more 
difficulties than short-term loans� Moreover, 
the long-term loans are subject to general 
restrictions (which apply to interest in 
particular): the application for repayment 
must be about the whole amount and 
the repayment made in the year prior to 
the company becoming insolvent may be 
challenged in a collective procedure�
Those restrictions do not apply if there is a 
control/ profit and loss pooling agreement 
since the subsidiary is protected by the loss 
compensation claim�
The long- and mid-term loans at a rate 
inferior to the market are fiscally reclassified 
as dividend, which means that the lending 
company is liable for taxes as if it had 
collected an interest at the market rate (i�e� 
the amount of the interest at the market 
rate is added to the taxable result), and the 
shareholder is liable for taxes as if they had 
received a dividend of the same amount� 
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-  Moreover, the controlling shareholder of a public 
limited company is often sentenced to compensation 
for the damage incurred by the company due to 
non-competitive conditions with another company of 
the group or with a shareholder� A shareholder may 
also assume personal liability when he has (directly 
or indirectly) made the company (even if it is a public 
limited company) charge non-competitive prices and 
that that has led the company to insolvency�
When minority shareholders 
(especially in listed companies) 
challenge these agreements, 
whether those different 
conditions have been met is 
checked�
The drawback to a profit and 
loss pooling agreement is the 
obligation for the shareholder 
to compensate the subsidiary 
for any loss incurred during 
the duration of the agreement 
(«loss compensation claim»)� 
That obligation remains 
after the agreement has 
been terminated� Usually the 
creditors do not have any 
interest in acting but in case 
of a collective procedure, the 
receiver can act in the name 
of the creditors, especially by 
pleading the inaccuracy of the 
accounts�
In the case of an international transaction, 
the lending company is also subject to a 
26�4% tax at source on the amount of the 
interest at the market rate, unless the foreign 
shareholder is subject to other obligations 
and thus has the right to a complete/
partial repayment of the at-source tax 
following a European or international fiscal 
convention�
Short-term loans without interest present no 
particular difficulty� They are not re-classified 
as contribution to a company since the 
absence of interest is not considered as a 
recognised asset in the balance sheet�
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-  Moreover, the controlling shareholder of a public 
limited company is often sentenced to compensation 
for the damage incurred by the company due to 
non-competitive conditions with another company of 
the group or with a shareholder� A shareholder may 
also assume personal liability when he has (directly 
or indirectly) made the company (even if it is a public 
limited company) charge non-competitive prices and 
that that has led the company to insolvency�
When minority shareholders 
(especially in listed companies) 
challenge these agreements, 
whether those different 
conditions have been met is 
checked�
The drawback to a profit and 
loss pooling agreement is the 
obligation for the shareholder 
to compensate the subsidiary 
for any loss incurred during 
the duration of the agreement 
(«loss compensation claim»)� 
That obligation remains 
after the agreement has 
been terminated� Usually the 
creditors do not have any 
interest in acting but in case 
of a collective procedure, the 
receiver can act in the name 
of the creditors, especially by 
pleading the inaccuracy of the 
accounts�
In the case of an international transaction, 
the lending company is also subject to a 
26�4% tax at source on the amount of the 
interest at the market rate, unless the foreign 
shareholder is subject to other obligations 
and thus has the right to a complete/
partial repayment of the at-source tax 
following a European or international fiscal 
convention�
Short-term loans without interest present no 
particular difficulty� They are not re-classified 
as contribution to a company since the 
absence of interest is not considered as a 
recognised asset in the balance sheet�
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Country Management fees Tax consolidation convention Interest-free loan
Belgium
Frequently used�
In principle, the payment of management fees is admitted 
in company law provided: (i) the parent company has 
performed real services; (ii) those services are in the 
interest of the subsidiary; and (iii) the amount paid by the 
subsidiary is not excessive and conforms to market prices�
From a fiscal point of view, the companies taking part in 
the transaction must be able to prove that the intra-group 
transaction has been carried out at arm’s length� Although 
no written document is a priori necessary for transfer 
prices, such means of evidence should be established so 
as to avoid any a posteriori challenge�
As to the arm’s-length principle, international and 
domestic transactions should be differentiated� Though 
Belgium complies with the EU and OECD directives on 
transfer prices in case of international transactions, the 
arm’s-length principle is interpreted and applied with more 
leniency in cases of domestic intra-group transactions� In 
that type of transactions, the test of the abnormal or free 
advantage applies and, if there is no group interest, that 
test supposes that since each company has an individual 
objective of profit-making and has therefore no interest in 
granting abnormal or free advantages to third parties, it 
is the same in case of intra-group transactions� Thus the 
legislator has provided that some market conditions must 
be applied so as to prevent companies from granting 
such advantages to an affiliated company� In the same 
way, Belgian fiscal law has created anti-abuse rules in 
case companies received abnormal or free advantages� 
No regrouping or fiscal 
consolidation (despite current 
negotiations on the application 
of the consolidated common 
tax base for company taxes 
among certain Member 
States� The concept of the 
group interest is not admitted 
in Belgian fiscal law yet� Each 
company must complete all 
the formalities and is assessed 
individually� Consequently, 
the losses, tax credits and 
deductions of a loss-making 
company cannot offset 
the taxable profit of other 
companies of the group�
The only exception to that rule 
is in the Belgian general code 
of taxation, which complies 
with the OECD convention, 
and provides that the Belgian 
companies of a multinational 
group may benefit from 
downward adjustments of 
the tax base and from the 
exemption of a surplus profit 
when the synergies within the 
group allow them to reduce 
their tax rate in Belgium�
Generally speaking, a Belgian company 
cannot normally approve that an interest-
free loan be secured in favour of another 
company of the group insofar as such a 
convention goes against its own corporate 
interest if it does not get any advantage 
from it�
Moreover, more than a violation of the 
corporate interest of the company in 
question, such a transaction may also 
appear as contrary to the principle of the 
legal specialty of the companies according 
to which any transaction that does not 
directly or indirectly benefit the company 
may justify its nullity or an impossibility of 
implementation�
Even if there may be such transactions, their 
capacity to be executed in a valid way is 
debatable and generally such operations 
should not be carried out� Only exceptional 
circumstances may justify an interest-free 
loan from the perspective of company law�
As to fiscal matters, anti-abuse rules apply 
in case of a violation of the principle of 
market conditions� When a company grants 
an interest-free loan to another company 
in its group, the non-charged interest may 
be added to the tax basis of the lending 
company (the advantage is considered to 
be abnormal or free)�
TOWARDS RECOGNITION OF THE GROUP INTEREST IN THE EUROPEAN UNION?
> Page 56
Country Management fees Tax consolidation convention Interest-free loan
Belgium
Frequently used�
In principle, the payment of management fees is admitted 
in company law provided: (i) the parent company has 
performed real services; (ii) those services are in the 
interest of the subsidiary; and (iii) the amount paid by the 
subsidiary is not excessive and conforms to market prices�
From a fiscal point of view, the companies taking part in 
the transaction must be able to prove that the intra-group 
transaction has been carried out at arm’s length� Although 
no written document is a priori necessary for transfer 
prices, such means of evidence should be established so 
as to avoid any a posteriori challenge�
As to the arm’s-length principle, international and 
domestic transactions should be differentiated� Though 
Belgium complies with the EU and OECD directives on 
transfer prices in case of international transactions, the 
arm’s-length principle is interpreted and applied with more 
leniency in cases of domestic intra-group transactions� In 
that type of transactions, the test of the abnormal or free 
advantage applies and, if there is no group interest, that 
test supposes that since each company has an individual 
objective of profit-making and has therefore no interest in 
granting abnormal or free advantages to third parties, it 
is the same in case of intra-group transactions� Thus the 
legislator has provided that some market conditions must 
be applied so as to prevent companies from granting 
such advantages to an affiliated company� In the same 
way, Belgian fiscal law has created anti-abuse rules in 
case companies received abnormal or free advantages� 
No regrouping or fiscal 
consolidation (despite current 
negotiations on the application 
of the consolidated common 
tax base for company taxes 
among certain Member 
States� The concept of the 
group interest is not admitted 
in Belgian fiscal law yet� Each 
company must complete all 
the formalities and is assessed 
individually� Consequently, 
the losses, tax credits and 
deductions of a loss-making 
company cannot offset 
the taxable profit of other 
companies of the group�
The only exception to that rule 
is in the Belgian general code 
of taxation, which complies 
with the OECD convention, 
and provides that the Belgian 
companies of a multinational 
group may benefit from 
downward adjustments of 
the tax base and from the 
exemption of a surplus profit 
when the synergies within the 
group allow them to reduce 
their tax rate in Belgium�
Generally speaking, a Belgian company 
cannot normally approve that an interest-
free loan be secured in favour of another 
company of the group insofar as such a 
convention goes against its own corporate 
interest if it does not get any advantage 
from it�
Moreover, more than a violation of the 
corporate interest of the company in 
question, such a transaction may also 
appear as contrary to the principle of the 
legal specialty of the companies according 
to which any transaction that does not 
directly or indirectly benefit the company 
may justify its nullity or an impossibility of 
implementation�
Even if there may be such transactions, their 
capacity to be executed in a valid way is 
debatable and generally such operations 
should not be carried out� Only exceptional 
circumstances may justify an interest-free 
loan from the perspective of company law�
As to fiscal matters, anti-abuse rules apply 
in case of a violation of the principle of 
market conditions� When a company grants 
an interest-free loan to another company 
in its group, the non-charged interest may 
be added to the tax basis of the lending 
company (the advantage is considered to 
be abnormal or free)�
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The penalties applicable when the market conditions are 
not complied with are either the taxation of the abnormal 
or free advantage at the level of the company which 
grants the advantage, or the refusal of certain deductions 
or compensations of the advantage at the level of the 
company which receives the advantage�
The general rules on the tax deductibility of business 
expense also apply� The rules are the following:
1�  expense must be incurred for the taxable result to be 
received or maintained;
2�  expense must be paid (or payable) in the taxation 
period; and
3�  the reality and amount of the expenses must be justified 
(especially with invoices)�
The first condition is the most important to determine if the 
incurred expenses by a Belgian tax-payer are deductible� 
At the tax administration initiative, case law has evolved 
and now demands a direct link between the incurred 
expenses and the professional activity of the company� 
As a general rule, the company must prove that it had 
an interest in the amounts in question to be allowed to 
deduct them�
The third condition is assessed on a factual basis� So as 
to avoid any debate in case of a posteriori control, the 
performance of the management services (timesheet, 
written record, calendar) should be justified in writing� As 
to the amount and the assessment methods, the arm’s-
length principle and the EU and OECD directives must be 
applied�
The Belgian company must be 
able to prove that the surplus 
of profit comes at least partly 
from the fact that it belongs 
to a multinational group and 
that it also benefits from other 
resources such as reputation, 
synergies, economies of scale, 
international network, etc� The 
Belgian companies claiming 
for these dispositions to be 
applied must file a petition for a 
unilateral decision on their case�
However, if the borrowing company is 
Belgian, the lending company will not 
be imposed that way� Indeed, since the 
borrowing company does not pay any 
interest, its tax base is more important and 
therefore there will be no loss for the tax 
administration� If the borrowing company is 
a foreign one, the loss in taxes justifies the 
taxation of the lending company on the 
non-charged interest�
Generally speaking, a company which 
has concluded an interest-free loan with 
another company of its group cannot 
benefit from certain tax deductions or 
compensations (especially the report of 
losses or the deduction of notional interests) 
insofar as it has received that advantage� 
Though it is recommended to avoid interest-
free loans, the latter are sometimes used in 
case of delivery of goods or performance 
of services in an intra-group context where 
the payment of the price is postponed� 
However, the circumstances in which 
such pratice is used should be carefully 
distinguished� Subject to the restrictions 
imposed by company law, if a creditor 
company wishes to contribute funds by 
waiving debt, an interest should be applied 
in order to avoid any re-classification as an 
abnormal or free advantage�
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The penalties applicable when the market conditions are 
not complied with are either the taxation of the abnormal 
or free advantage at the level of the company which 
grants the advantage, or the refusal of certain deductions 
or compensations of the advantage at the level of the 
company which receives the advantage�
The general rules on the tax deductibility of business 
expense also apply� The rules are the following:
1�  expense must be incurred for the taxable result to be 
received or maintained;
2�  expense must be paid (or payable) in the taxation 
period; and
3�  the reality and amount of the expenses must be justified 
(especially with invoices)�
The first condition is the most important to determine if the 
incurred expenses by a Belgian tax-payer are deductible� 
At the tax administration initiative, case law has evolved 
and now demands a direct link between the incurred 
expenses and the professional activity of the company� 
As a general rule, the company must prove that it had 
an interest in the amounts in question to be allowed to 
deduct them�
The third condition is assessed on a factual basis� So as 
to avoid any debate in case of a posteriori control, the 
performance of the management services (timesheet, 
written record, calendar) should be justified in writing� As 
to the amount and the assessment methods, the arm’s-
length principle and the EU and OECD directives must be 
applied�
The Belgian company must be 
able to prove that the surplus 
of profit comes at least partly 
from the fact that it belongs 
to a multinational group and 
that it also benefits from other 
resources such as reputation, 
synergies, economies of scale, 
international network, etc� The 
Belgian companies claiming 
for these dispositions to be 
applied must file a petition for a 
unilateral decision on their case�
However, if the borrowing company is 
Belgian, the lending company will not 
be imposed that way� Indeed, since the 
borrowing company does not pay any 
interest, its tax base is more important and 
therefore there will be no loss for the tax 
administration� If the borrowing company is 
a foreign one, the loss in taxes justifies the 
taxation of the lending company on the 
non-charged interest�
Generally speaking, a company which 
has concluded an interest-free loan with 
another company of its group cannot 
benefit from certain tax deductions or 
compensations (especially the report of 
losses or the deduction of notional interests) 
insofar as it has received that advantage� 
Though it is recommended to avoid interest-
free loans, the latter are sometimes used in 
case of delivery of goods or performance 
of services in an intra-group context where 
the payment of the price is postponed� 
However, the circumstances in which 
such pratice is used should be carefully 
distinguished� Subject to the restrictions 
imposed by company law, if a creditor 
company wishes to contribute funds by 
waiving debt, an interest should be applied 
in order to avoid any re-classification as an 
abnormal or free advantage�
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